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INTRODUCTION 
A record-setting number of individuals were exonerated and 
released from prisons across the United States in 2015, bringing the 
troubling reality of wrongful convictions to the forefront of public 
discourse.1 Yet the issue of wrongful sentencing—the incarceration of 
an individual for a longer period of time than she deserves based on 
her offense of conviction and criminal history—remains mere 
background noise in the discussion.2 Although wrongful conviction 
has found greater traction in the media, wrongful sentencing works 
similarly devastating impacts on prisoners’ lives.3 In both situations, a 
 
 1. One hundred twenty-five wrongfully convicted people were exonerated in 2014. 
See, e.g., Mary Wisniewski, Exonerations of U.S. Criminals Hit Record in 2014: Study, 
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2015, 12:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/27/us-usa-
crime-exonerations-idUSKBN0L00B620150127 [http://perma.cc/EVK5-6FAK] (discussing 
the record-high number of exonerees in 2014 and its correlation to increased cooperation 
among counsel for the wrongfully convicted, prosecutors, and law enforcement). 
According to the University of Michigan Law School’s National Registry of Exonerations, 
the number was even higher in 2015, with 149 individuals exonerated. 2015 Exonerations, 
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages
/browse.aspx?View={B8342AE7-6520-4A32-8A06-4B326208BAF8}&FilterField1
=Exonerated&FilterValue1=8%5F2015 [http://perma.cc/7WLM-ERHS].  
 2. A proper federal sentence is based on the offense level of the defendant’s crime of 
conviction, with appropriate adjustments for specific offense characteristics and the 
defendant’s criminal history category. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §	1B1.1 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 3. To follow along with the mechanics of the following example, see the Sentencing 
Table in Appendix I. Take, for example, an individual who is convicted of a federal 
kidnapping crime. Id.	§	2A4.1. This individual’s base offense level under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines is thirty-two, id. §	2A4.1(a), and increases to thirty-four if he used a 
firearm to commit the offense, id. §	2A4.1(b)(3). The individual’s sentencing range, based 
solely on his crime of conviction, is 151 to 188 months. Id. at 404. If the defendant has two 
prior aggravated assault convictions and, as a result, is sentenced as a career offender, the 
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person is incarcerated for some period of time on the basis of a crime 
he did not commit. 
Despite the equivalent practical effect of wrongful conviction 
and wrongful sentencing, the judicial system currently treats the two 
situations differently based on a belief that they implicate “varying 
degrees of injustice.”4 For instance, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of allowing a petitioner’s claim that she is 
innocent of her crime of conviction to overcome judge-made 
procedural bars to federal habeas corpus review (“conviction 
innocence”).5 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has concluded that a 
petitioner presenting credible evidence that he is innocent of the 
aggravating factors that elevated his sentence to death can receive 
habeas review despite procedural bars to relief (“capital sentence 
innocence”).6 But only a handful of circuit courts have recognized an 
exception to procedural bars to habeas review for petitioners who 
claim innocence of a prior conviction that served as a basis for 
enhancing their noncapital sentence (“noncapital sentence 
innocence”).7 
 
guidelines mandate that his criminal history category is VI. Id. §	4B1.1 (stating that a 
person will be sentenced as a career offender if (1) he was at least eighteen years of age at 
the time he committed the crime of conviction, (2) the crime of conviction is either a 
felony crime of violence or felony controlled substance offense, and (3) he has at least two 
prior felony crime of violence or controlled substance convictions). In this example, 
applying a criminal history category VI results in a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months. 
Id. at 404. If the defendant is innocent of one of his prior convictions for aggravated 
assault, then he has been improperly sentenced as a career offender and subjected to a 
more severe sentence than he deserves. Had the sentence been properly calculated, with 
only one prior aggravated assault conviction, the defendant would have had three prior 
conviction points, id. §	4A1.1(a), resulting in a criminal history category of II and a 
sentence of 168 to 210 months, id. at 404. As a result of the defendant’s improper 
classification as a career offender, he was sentenced to a prison term of at least seven years 
and ten months and up to nine years and nine months longer than he deserves.  
 4. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 5. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (finding that a habeas 
petitioner’s credible claim of conviction innocence could overcome the traditional 
prohibition on successive petitions for habeas relief). 
 6. See generally Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (creating the capital sentence 
exception to judge-made bars to relief). 
 7. For a complete discussion of this circuit split, see infra Section I.B. I use the 
phrase “sentence innocence” to refer to the situation in which a petitioner claims 
innocence of a prior conviction or aggravating sentencing factor and, therefore, innocence 
of the enhanced sentence imposed by the trial court. As explained infra Section I.A, 
sentence innocence breaks down into two subsets: (1) capital sentence innocence, in which 
the petitioner claims innocence of the aggravating factors that resulted in imposition of the 
death penalty; and (2) noncapital sentence innocence, in which the petitioner claims 
innocence of one or more prior convictions that enhanced his noncapital sentence. 
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Deepening the distinction between conviction and sentence 
innocence, the Supreme Court recently held that a credible claim of 
conviction innocence could overcome not only judge-made bars to 
habeas review, but also statutory bars (“conviction innocence 
exception”).8 In McQuiggin v. Perkins,9 the Supreme Court 
recognized that a petitioner who presents convincing evidence of 
conviction innocence could petition for habeas review even after the 
one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions10 established by the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) 
expires.11 Yet, a prisoner with a convincing claim of noncapital 
sentence innocence is powerless to overcome AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations, no matter how egregious the sentencing error below.12 
This Comment argues that treating innocence claims differently 
depending on the type of innocence—conviction or sentence—at 
issue creates a distinction without a difference. In each scenario, an 
individual is punished more severely than warranted. Courts should 
recognize the functional equivalence of these two situations and allow 
both credible conviction and sentence innocence claims to trigger 
exceptions to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on 
postconviction relief, the three innocence exceptions prior to 
AEDPA, the changes wrought by AEDPA, and the contradictory 
development of the noncapital sentence exception in various circuit 
courts. Part II explores the Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin v. 
Perkins, which allows a credible conviction innocence claim to 
overcome AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations on habeas review. 
Part III suggests that the underlying reasoning in McQuiggin, Fourth 
Circuit precedent, and the fundamental similarities between wrongful 
 
 8. See generally McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). I use the phrase 
“conviction innocence exception” to refer to the situation in which a petitioner claims to 
be actually innocent of the crime that resulted in the conviction being challenged on 
habeas review. 
 9. 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. §	2244(d)(1) (2012) (imposing an identical statute of limitations on state 
habeas petitions); §	2255(f) (imposing a statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions). 
 11. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932. 
 12. Petitioners have been uniformly unsuccessful in their attempts to convince federal 
courts to recognize a sentence exception to the AEDPA statute of limitations analogous 
to the conviction innocence exception established in McQuiggin. See, e.g., United States v. 
Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2014); Sims v. United States, No. 1:04–CR–0048–ODE–
JFK–1, 2014 WL 229335, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2014); Hall v. United States, No. 4:12–
02462–TLW, 2014 WL 130446, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 14, 2014); Ellerman v. Walton, 13–cv–
063–CJP, 2014 WL 103831, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2014); United States v. Robinson, No. 
10–40037, 2013 WL 5874012, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2013). 
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conviction and wrongful sentencing weigh in favor of allowing 
credible noncapital sentence innocence claims to overcome 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Part III also offers hypotheticals that 
could persuade the Fourth Circuit to create just such an exception.13 
Finally, Part IV addresses several counterarguments critics may make 
against allowing a noncapital sentence exception to the statute of 
limitations, concluding that the exception, where properly invoked, 
should apply regardless of whether a bar to review is judge-made or 
statutory. 
I.  THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: EXPANSION, CONTRACTION, AND 
THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION 
This Part sets forth a brief history of the judicial expansion of 
habeas review and Congress’s responsive tightening of the writ 
through AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. It also details the 
creation and expansion of the conviction and sentence innocence 
exceptions, which were established prior to AEDPA. The Part then 
examines the existing circuit split over whether noncapital sentence 
innocence should be the basis of an exception to judge-made, pre-
AEDPA bars to habeas relief. This split has become even more 
significant since the Court’s ruling in McQuiggin because it identifies 
the most favorable forums for petitioners arguing that the McQuiggin 
holding should apply to noncapital sentence innocence, as well as 
conviction innocence. The Part concludes by explaining AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations, which worked a major change in habeas 
jurisprudence. 
A. The Pre-AEDPA Actual Innocence Exception to Procedural Bars 
Long before AEDPA, and in an effort to stem the rapid flow of 
federal habeas petitions, the Supreme Court imposed various 
procedural requirements on habeas petitioners that, if not met, 
 
 13. This Comment limits its scope to the Fourth Circuit for a number of reasons. First, 
Fourth Circuit precedent provides a unique balance between the disavowal of the 
noncapital sentence exception and liberal application of the exception, which mitigates 
concerns over the administrability of expanding the exception to AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations. See infra Section I.B.3. Further, the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in United 
States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2014), implicitly leaves the door open for future 
defendants with a specific set of facts to successfully argue for the expansion of the 
noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See infra Section III.B. 
This confluence of circumstances renders the Fourth Circuit a prime candidate for 
analysis. 
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rendered courts unable to undertake habeas review.14 These judge-
made, procedural bars prohibited habeas review in situations 
including: 
 	Procedural default without cause: failing to adhere to a 
state court’s procedural requirements due to no external 
impediment and resulting in a failure to properly preserve the 
issue at the state level;15 
 	Successive petitions: filing an additional habeas petition on 
the same grounds set forth in a previous, rejected petition;16 
and 
 	Abusive petitions: filing a habeas petition on the basis of an 
argument or claim that could have been, but was not, raised at 
an earlier stage of the litigation, such as at trial or before a 
lower appellate court.17 
The purpose of the successiveness and procedural default bars 
was to ensure that federal court caseloads were not unreasonably 
burdened by frivolous habeas claims.18 Yet, to ensure that prisoners 
were not unjustly incarcerated simply because of their failure to 
adhere to procedural rules, the Court established the “miscarriage of 
justice exception[,]” which allowed the Court to hear procedurally 
barred habeas claims upon the petitioner’s showing that “a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to 
entertain the claim.”19 
The stated purpose of the exception was to “serve[] as ‘an 
additional safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer an 
unconstitutional loss of liberty.’	”20 The Court originally intended this 
exception to be a narrow one, applied only in “extraordinary 
instances when a constitutional violation likely has caused the 
conviction of one innocent of the crime.”21 The exception was framed 
 
 14. Kimberly A. Thomas, Substantive Habeas, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2014) 
(noting that procedural requirements implemented by the Supreme Court “narrowed the 
federal courthouse door to review of the merits of inmates’ claims”). 
 15. Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional 
Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 327. 
 16. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931.  
 17. Id. at 1931–32.  
 18. Thomas, supra note 14, at 1750. 
 19. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1995). 
 20. Id. at 495 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491–92 n.31 (1976)). 
 21. Id. at 494. The foundation of the conviction innocence exception is seen in various 
cases. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (“[W]e think that in an 
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in terms of “actual innocence.”22 Petitioners with a credible actual 
innocence claim could overcome procedural bars to review despite 
their inability to show cause for their default.23 
Although the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that this 
exception was a narrow one, it and other federal courts ultimately 
expanded the exception beyond its original application to conviction 
innocence and into the sentencing context, creating a sentence 
exception first for capital sentences24 and later, in some circuits, for 
noncapital sentences.25 In the sentencing realm, a prisoner’s actual 
innocence does not mean that he is “innocent of the crime,” but 
rather that he is “actually less guilty” than he was determined to be at 
sentencing.26 The Supreme Court has affirmed the expansion of the 
actual innocence exception only to the context of capital sentencing. 
In Sawyer v. Whitley,27 the Court acknowledged that deeming a 
person “innocent of death” is syntactically strange.28 Nonetheless, it 
held that a petitioner may seek habeas review despite procedural bars 
if she can provide proof that she is actually innocent of either: (1) the 
elements of the underlying crime of conviction, again affirming the 
conviction innocence exception; or (2) the aggravating factors that 
resulted in the imposition of the death sentence, acknowledging for 
the first time the capital sentence exception.29 
 
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction 
of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the 
absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”). The exception has since been 
expanded to various degrees by federal courts, including the Supreme Court, to apply to 
the death penalty and, in some circuits, to noncapital sentences. See infra Section I.B. 
 22. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992). 
 23. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (holding that a petitioner 
making a “colorable claim of factual innocence” can overcome the procedural bar on 
second and successive petitions for habeas review, which are typically prohibited absent a 
showing of cause or prejudice). 
 24. See generally Sawyer, 505 U.S. 333 (creating the capital sentence innocence 
exception). 
 25. See generally, e.g., United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(authorizing a noncapital sentence innocence exception). 
 26. Matthew Mattingly, Actually Less Guilty: The Extension of the Actual Innocence 
Exception to the Sentencing Phase of Non-Capital Cases, 93 KY. L.J. 531, 536 (2004). While 
it is syntactically strange to think of a person being actually innocent of his sentence, this is 
exactly the terminology employed by courts. An actual innocence claim based on 
innocence of the crime of conviction is termed “actual innocence of conviction,” while a 
claim based on sentencing miscalculations or innocence of a prior crime taken into 
account for sentencing purposes is dubbed “actual innocence of sentence.” For brevity I 
refer to these categories as “conviction innocence” and “sentence innocence,” 
respectively. 
 27. 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
 28. Id. at 341. 
 29. Id. at 346–47. 
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Going a step further than the Supreme Court, some circuit courts 
began to expand the sentence exception from capital cases to 
noncapital cases, allowing sentencing errors in these cases to 
overcome procedural bars to habeas review.30 The Supreme Court 
was presented with the opportunity to decide whether the actual 
innocence of noncapital sentence exception (“noncapital sentence 
exception”) was proper in Dretke v. Haley31 but chose not to resolve 
the circuit split. Rather than deciding the validity of the exception, the 
Court directed lower courts to look for any alternative grounds for 
granting postconviction relief before wading into the quagmires of 
innocence claims and the various innocence-based exceptions.32 As a 
result, a circuit split continues unabated over whether there should be 
a noncapital sentence exception for procedural bars to habeas relief.33 
B. The Ongoing Circuit Split 
Due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dretke, the expansion of 
the innocence exception from conviction innocence, to capital 
sentence innocence, and finally to noncapital sentence innocence 
remains subject to a circuit split.34 Although this split developed prior 
to AEDPA, it remains relevant today because AEDPA codified the 
originally judge-made bars, which have since been consistently 
subjected to the same innocence-based exception scheme that 
 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994). These two 
branches of case law are distinguished by the terms “actual innocence of capital sentence” 
and “actual innocence of noncapital sentence.” Id. 
 31. 541 U.S. 386, 393–94 (2004). 
 32. When declining the opportunity to resolve the existing circuit split over whether 
to recognize an actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception, the Court stated: 
We are asked in the present case to extend the actual innocence exception to 
procedural default of constitutional claims challenging noncapital sentencing 
error. We decline to answer the question in the posture of this case and instead 
hold that a federal court faced with allegations of actual innocence, whether of the 
sentence or of the crime charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for 
comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default. 
Id. 
 33. As will be discussed infra Part III, the possibility exists for this noncapital 
sentence exception to be applied to statutory bars in some circumstances. Dretke does not 
foreclose the prospect that the Court will recognize and apply the actual innocence of 
noncapital sentence exception in the future; it merely demonstrates the Court’s 
unwillingness to do so on Dretke’s facts. 
 34. The circuit split over the recognition and application of the noncapital sentence 
exception to judge-made procedural bars is still relevant because AEDPA codified many 
of these bars, making the jurisprudence addressed in this Section applicable to the 
question of whether the now-statutory bars can be overridden by the various innocence 
claims. See infra Section I.C. 
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flourished prior to AEDPA.35 Thus, conflict over whether noncapital 
sentence innocence triggers an exception to these now statutory 
procedural bars to habeas review renders some jurisdictions more 
desirable than others for litigants seeking to expand the noncapital 
sentence exception to include AEDPA’s statute of limitations.36 
Circuit courts tend to treat the noncapital sentence exception in 
one of three ways. First, some circuits refuse to recognize the 
exception, applying only the conviction and capital sentence 
exceptions recognized by the Supreme Court.37 Second, other circuits 
apply a relatively limitless noncapital sentence exception, imposing 
few requirements on the types of petitioners and sentences that are 
eligible.38 Third, some circuits recognize the noncapital sentence 
exception but condition its application, for instance, by making it 
available solely to prisoners sentenced as career offenders.39 Each 
approach is addressed in turn. 
1.  No Recognition: The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit has refused to recognize the noncapital 
sentence exception. The court instead recognizes only the conviction 
and capital sentence exceptions, which have express Supreme Court 
approval. 
In United States v. Richards,40 the Tenth Circuit firmly declined 
to recognize the noncapital sentence exception.41 The petitioner, 
incarcerated for 188 months on a federal drug offense,42 filed a second 
§	2255 motion (a petition for habeas review of a federal court’s 
sentencing decision) for habeas relief after his first petition was 
 
 35. See, e.g., Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 
170–71 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 36. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 37. The Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits are representative of those courts that 
do not recognize the actual innocence exception as it applies to noncapital sentences. See, 
e.g., Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 706 (8th Cir. 2011); Gilbert v. United States, 
640 F.3d 1293, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371–72 (10th 
Cir. 1993). 
 38. See, e.g., Spence, 219 F.3d at 170–71. 
 39. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits are among those courts that have taken this 
approach. See, e.g., Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 40. 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 41. Id. at 1371. 
 42. The petitioner pled guilty to possession of one kilogram or more of a mixture 
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, with intent to manufacture 
methamphetamine in powder form. Id. at 1370. The illegal drug was incorporated into a 
wastewater mixture. Id. 
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denied.43 This second petition was granted, and the petitioner’s 
sentence was reduced from 188 months to 60 months.44 The State 
appealed this reduction, claiming that the petition was successive and, 
therefore, barred from the court’s consideration.45 On appeal before 
the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued that his original sentence was 
improperly calculated because it was not “proportionate to his 
culpability.”46 The defendant claimed that this improper sentence was 
a miscarriage of justice and, thus, should render him eligible for 
postconviction review despite the fact that his habeas petition was 
barred as successive.47 In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit firmly stated 
that only petitioners who are “actually innocent of the [convicted] 
offense” are eligible for application of an innocence-based 
exception.48 
Since Richards, the Tenth Circuit has consistently echoed its 
refusal to recognize the noncapital sentence exception.49 As a result, a 
prisoner who files a procedurally defaulted habeas petition on the 
basis of an error or miscalculation in her noncapital sentence finds an 
unfriendly forum in the Tenth Circuit.50 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1371. The petitioner argued that his base offense level under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines was improperly calculated because it took into account the weight 
of some of the wastewater mixture rather than the incorporated methamphetamine alone. 
Id. at 1370. 
 47. Id. at 1370–71. 
 48. Id. at 1371 (“[The defendant] does not claim to be actually innocent of the offense 
for which he was convicted; he claims only that he should have received a lesser sentence. 
A person cannot be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence, however.”). 
 49. Despite its continued refusal to recognize the noncapital sentence exception 
outright, in the court’s own words, its stance on the noncapital sentence exception is far 
from “pellucid.” Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 545 n.6 (10th Cir. 2013). For an 
example of the court’s willingness to recognize the noncapital sentence exception when a 
petitioner is sentenced as a habitual offender but is factually innocent of one of the crimes 
that form the basis of his classification as a habitual offender, see Selsor v. Kaiser, 22 F.3d 
1029, 1036 (10th Cir. 1994). A retreat from the strong pronouncement that there can be no 
noncapital sentence innocence would likely render the Tenth Circuit’s treatment of 
noncapital sentence innocence claims quite similar to the Fourth Circuit’s, which is 
addressed more fully below in Section I.B.3. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Denny, 694 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing 
the petitioner’s actual innocence claim because the court’s precedent dictates that it is 
impossible to be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence); Reid v. Oklahoma, 101 F.3d 
628, 630 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Further, we find nothing in the record to implicate the 
‘miscarriage of justice’ exception, which requires a claim of actual innocence regarding the 
offense under review.”). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 991 (2016) 
2016] VARYING DEGREES OF INNOCENCE? 1001 
2.  Liberal Application: The Second Circuit 
In stark contrast to the Tenth Circuit, the Second Circuit has not 
only recognized the noncapital sentence exception, but has also given 
it broad application.51 This liberal construction is based on the court’s 
interpretation of Sawyer, where the Supreme Court recognized the 
capital sentence exception to procedural bars to habeas relief.52 The 
court reads Sawyer’s holding as based not on some fundamental 
difference between the death penalty and noncapital sentences, but 
on “whether the constitutional error [that is the subject of the habeas 
petition] ‘undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing 
determination.’	”53 The Second Circuit espouses the view that 
“[b]ecause the harshness of the sentence does not affect the habeas 
analysis and the ultimate issue, the justice of the incarceration, is the 
same, there is no reason why the actual innocence exception should 
not apply to noncapital sentencing procedures” just as it applies to the 
death penalty.54 This reasoning prioritizes the principal purpose of all 
habeas review cases—to correct unwarranted and unjustly imposed 
sentences regardless of their degree of severity or permanence.55 
The Second Circuit places few conditions on petitioners’ access 
to the noncapital sentence exception. Borrego v. United States56 sets 
forth the circuit’s three-prong test for determining whether the 
exception may be invoked: 
(1) The sentence imposed was the result of a violation of the 
petitioner’s constitutional rights; 
(2) the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence that 
she is innocent of the facts on which her sentence was based; 
and 
(3) the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum permitted 
under the applicable statute when the appropriate facts are 
taken into consideration.57 
 
 51. See, e.g., Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 
170–71 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 52. Id. at 171–72. 
 53. Id. at 170–71 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)). 
 54. Id. at 171. 
 55. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 320–21 (1995) (stating that the end goal of all habeas 
review is “correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration”). 
 56. 975 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 57. Id. at 525. 
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This standard does not require the petitioner to have been 
sentenced under a particular sentencing scheme, such as the Armed 
Career Criminal Act,58 or that the petitioner demonstrate factual, as 
opposed to legal, innocence of a prior conviction that formed the 
basis for the petitioner’s sentence.59 The Second Circuit does, 
however, provide that only those petitioners whose imposed 
sentences exceed the maximum period of incarceration for the range 
in which they should have been classified can seek review through the 
noncapital sentence exception.60 
Although the Second Circuit’s liberal application of the 
noncapital sentence exception offers broad access for habeas 
petitioners, the relative dearth of conditions it imposes on the 
exception’s application creates significant administrability concerns.61 
The Second Circuit’s approach, though ideal from a fairness and 
justice perspective, is thus less practicable and probably less 
politically feasible than the Fourth Circuit’s more measured, 
 
 58. For example, in Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, the 
Second Circuit applied the noncapital sentence exception in a case where the petitioner 
was not sentenced as a habitual offender, but had his sentence enhanced from probation 
to jail time after allegedly violating his plea agreement. Spence, 219 F.3d at 172. The 
petitioner’s plea agreement included a provision that would revoke probation and trigger 
imprisonment if he committed another, future criminal act. Id. at 169 (describing the plea 
agreement as “a term of probation in exchange for a promise not to engage in misconduct 
leading to an arrest”). When, after entering this agreement, the petitioner was arrested for 
an armed robbery, his term of imprisonment was enhanced to between eight and one-third 
to twenty-five years. Id. at 166. The petitioner was later acquitted of the armed robbery 
that triggered his sentencing enhancement. Id. The Second Circuit allowed the petitioner 
to take advantage of the noncapital sentence exception based on a basic conception of 
innocence, rather than satisfaction of complicated requirements: “Where a sentencing 
court relies on the commission of an act subsequent to trial or to a guilty plea as grounds 
for raising the defendant’s sentence	.	.	.	,	a petitioner may properly challenge the 
conclusion that he committed the subsequent act on the ground that he was actually 
innocent	.	.	.	.” Id. at 171–72. Although the quoted language is time-based in its focus on a 
conviction that occurs after sentencing, other samples of the court’s language are quite 
broad, indicating that prior convictions of which a defendant is actually innocent also 
warrant application of the noncapital sentence exception. See id. at 172 (describing the 
“quintessential miscarriage of justice” as “a person being punished for an act he did not 
commit”). 
 59. As will be discussed infra Section I.B.3, these and other conditions are 
prerequisites for application of the actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception in 
some circuits, and they may be advisable to deal with certain administrative implications 
of recognizing the exception. See also infra Section III.B.2. 
 60. This condition helps reduce the administrative burden of actual innocence of 
noncapital sentence claims. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 61. For a more complete discussion of the relationship between administrability in the 
federal judicial branch and expansion of the noncapital sentence exception, see infra 
Section IV.B. 
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conditionally applied noncapital sentence exception, discussed in the 
next Section. 
3.  Conditional Application: The Fourth Circuit 
In a middle-of-the-road approach, the Fourth Circuit recognizes 
the noncapital sentence exception but subjects it to certain 
constraints. Much like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit bases its 
recognition of the exception on the Supreme Court’s determination 
that capital sentence innocence warrants special treatment in the 
postconviction relief context.62 The Fourth Circuit reasons that, 
“[e]xcept for the obvious difference in the severity of the sentences, 
[there is] little difference between holding that a defendant can be 
innocent of the acts required to enhance a sentence in a death case 
and applying a parallel rationale in non-capital cases.”63 In capital 
cases, the presence of aggravating factors can result in an enhanced 
sentence: death. Similarly, in noncapital cases, the presence of certain 
factors, namely prior convictions, can lead to a more severe—in other 
words, longer—sentence.64 For the Fourth Circuit, the fundamental 
similarity between sentencing errors in capital and noncapital cases—
a more severe sentence than warranted on the facts—compels the 
court to provide a remedy for both types of error. 
The Fourth Circuit first recognized the noncapital sentence 
exception in United States v. Maybeck.65 In that case, the defendant 
mistakenly characterized one of his prior burglary convictions as a 
violent felony at sentencing, leading him to be inaccurately classified 
as a career offender and improperly placed into a higher criminal 
history category.66 This error resulted in an enhanced sentence.67 The 
petitioner did not object to his improper classification as a career 
offender at sentencing or on appeal, but later filed a §	2255 motion for 
postconviction relief.68 This motion was denied as procedurally 
defaulted without cause because the petitioner failed to exercise his 
right to appeal the sentence or object to its improper basis below.69 
 
 62. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340–41 (1992). 
 63. United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 64. See id. 
 65. 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 66. Id. at 890. 
 67. Id. at 890–91. 
 68. Id. at 891. A §	2255 motion refers to the petition for habeas relief brought by a 
federal prisoner, and a §	2244 motion is the analogue for a state prisoner. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§	2244, 2255 (2012). 
 69. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 891 (finding that the defendant’s failure to raise his improper 
classification as a career offender and resulting placement in a higher criminal history 
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis of the noncapital 
sentence exception, finding that the petitioner’s prior burglary 
conviction did not qualify as a violent felony, that he was improperly 
sentenced as a career offender, and that he was, therefore, innocent 
of his noncapital sentence.70 This conclusion allowed the petitioner to 
have his §	2255 motion heard despite its untimeliness and procedural 
default. 
The Fourth Circuit later cabined its adoption of the noncapital 
sentence exception in two ways. In United States v. Mikalajunas,71 the 
court restricted application of the exception to instances where a 
defendant’s sentence is improperly based on his wrongful 
classification as a habitual or career offender.72 After this case, a 
petitioner with a procedurally defaulted claim who argues for 
application of the noncapital sentence exception must allege that she 
is innocent of one of the underlying crimes that served as the 
predicate for her classification specifically as a habitual or career 
offender.73 Sentencing enhancement schemes other than habitual 
offender provisions do not trigger the noncapital sentence 
exception.74 
Second, the Fourth Circuit began requiring a showing of factual 
innocence in noncapital sentence innocence claims. Factual innocence 
requires the petitioner to show that he actually did not commit one or 
more of the crimes on which his sentence was predicated, not merely 
that a procedural or constitutional defect at trial resulted in a legally 
wrongful conviction.75 Similarly, petitioners seeking habeas review to 
 
category as an objection at the sentencing hearing was a procedural default barring a 
motion for habeas review). Procedural defaults come in a variety of shapes and sizes, 
including “successive” petitions based on arguments previously rejected, “abusive” 
petitions based on claims that could have been, but were not, raised in an initial petition, 
and a general failure to observe rules, such as filing deadlines. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 
S. Ct. 1924, 1931–32 (2013) (citations omitted). 
 70. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 892, 894. In more familiar language, the petitioner was in fact 
“less guilty” than his original, disproportionate, and, ultimately, unjust sentence. 
 71. 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 72. See id. at 494–95. For a discussion of the types of sentencing schemes that fall 
under the general heading of “habitual or career offender” provisions, see infra Section 
III.B.1. 
 73. See Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 495. 
 74. For instance, in Mikalajunas, the court held that the two petitioners were 
ineligible for the noncapital sentence exception when they sought habeas review of their 
sentences under the theory that they had not restrained the victim and, therefore, should 
not have been subject to the corresponding sentencing enhancement. Id. at 492. This 
aggravating factor claim is not based on innocence of a prior conviction. 
 75. Id. at 494 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339–41 (1992)) (“[A] petitioner 
must demonstrate actual factual innocence of the offense of conviction, i.e., that petitioner 
did not commit the crime of which he was convicted; this standard is not satisfied by a 
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appeal a question of statutory interpretation cannot use the 
noncapital sentence exception to achieve review of procedurally 
defaulted claims.76 Mikalajunas also established an evidentiary 
standard, requiring a petitioner to present clear and convincing 
evidence of factual innocence of a prior conviction before the 
noncapital sentence exception can apply.77 The conditions imposed on 
the noncapital sentence exception in the Fourth Circuit make it a 
prime jurisdiction for the creation of an administrable exception to 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.78 While these conditions do close the 
court’s doors to some unjustly sentenced petitioners, the same 
conditions provide strong counterarguments to opponents’ assertions 
that expanding the noncapital sentence exception would be hugely 
unadministrable, undermine the finality of judicial decisions, and 
result in an untenable flood of litigation in federal district courts, 
making an expansion more palatable to opponents. 
As this Section demonstrates, recognition and application of the 
noncapital sentence exception varies among the circuit courts. Those 
jurisdictions that have taken the initial step of recognizing the 
noncapital sentence exception are those most likely to expand the 
exception outside its current context of procedural bars and into new 
statutory bars, such as AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Those courts 
that have stringently limited or refused to acknowledge the exception 
are unlikely to be attractive forums for expansion. 
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Congress 
Reins in the Courts’ Broad Interpretation of Habeas Review 
By 1991, the judiciary had expanded habeas corpus jurisprudence 
significantly, allowing federal courts to hear “all dispositive 
constitutional claims” that were properly presented and unmarred by 
unexcused procedural errors.79 The innocence exceptions, which 
 
showing that a petitioner is legally, but not factually, innocent.”); see also United States v. 
Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 894) (“[A]ctual 
innocence applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge 
to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes, and not from the legal 
classification of the predicate crimes.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284 (holding that a petitioner seeking to overcome 
procedural bars to review through the actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception 
was ineligible for the exception because the basis of his appeal was whether one of his 
prior convictions ought to be interpreted as a violent felony, not presentation of evidence 
tending to show that he was in fact innocent of the previously convicted crime). 
 77. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493. 
 78. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 79. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991); see also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 
386, 388 (2004) (“Out of respect for finality, comity, and the orderly administration of 
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allowed courts to hear procedurally barred claims where the 
petitioner presented a credible claim of conviction or capital sentence 
innocence (and, in some circuits, even noncapital sentence 
innocence), were some of the primary tools courts used to expand the 
writ.80 
In response to expansive judicial interpretation of the right to 
habeas review, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996.81 AEDPA’s habeas reforms were largely 
aimed at imposing limitations on what Congress believed was a 
widely abused writ.82 AEDPA reformed the judiciary’s habeas 
practices in a number of ways,83 including by formally codifying judge-
made procedural bars, such as the prohibition on successive 
petitions.84 The codification of these formerly judge-made procedural 
bars simultaneously incorporated the jurisprudence surrounding the 
various innocence-based exceptions, rendering the circuit split over 
whether to recognize the noncapital sentence exception relevant even 
after AEDPA.85 The difference is that the circuit split now centers on 
 
justice, a federal court will not entertain a procedurally defaulted constitutional claim in a 
petition for habeas corpus absent a showing of cause and prejudice to excuse the 
default.”). 
 80. See supra Section I.A. 
 81. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 82. For example, see Anthony Roby, Taking a Heavy Toll: The Constitutional 
Implications of Prohibiting Equitable Tolling in Cases of Actual Innocence, 89 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 81, 83 (2011) (“The passage of AEDPA marked Congress’s most recent 
effort to ‘curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus	.	.	.	.’	” (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 944)). 
 83. For example, AEDPA amends Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure to dictate that habeas petitions must be heard first in the appropriate federal 
district court and amends 28 U.S.C. §	2254 to require exhaustion of state remedies before 
appeal to the federal courts. §§	103, 104, 110 Stat. at 1218. Because the focus of this 
Comment is on expanding the applicability of the actual innocence exception to include 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, only the creation of the one-year statute of limitations 
will be addressed here. 
 84. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §	2244(b)(1)–(2) (2012) (barring second or successive petitions 
for habeas review). 
 85. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013) (stating that “[t]he miscarriage 
of justice exception	.	.	.	survived AEDPA’s passage”). The phrase “miscarriage of justice 
exception” is another way federal courts have referred to the concept behind the 
innocence-based exceptions to procedurally defaulted habeas review: that it is a manifest 
injustice to allow an innocent person to be wrongfully incarcerated for any period of time. 
See, e.g., id. at 1935 (finding a “miscarriage of justice” when “no reasonable juror would 
have convicted” the petitioner of his crime of conviction); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
320–21 (1995) (explaining that the goal behind all habeas review is to avoid wrongful 
incarceration of innocent individuals); Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. 
Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 2000) (equating a “miscarriage of justice” with a 
sentence improperly based on a wrongful act the defendant did not commit). 
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whether the exception can circumvent statutory bars to review rather 
than judge-made bars. 
AEDPA’s most notable change to the habeas regime was its 
implementation of a one-year statute of limitations on all petitions for 
review.86 Although judge-made procedural bars did exist,87 AEDPA 
was Congress’s first foray into establishing a formal statute of 
limitations period for habeas petitions.88 This one-year statute of 
limitations applies to both state and federal prisoners’ petitions for 
habeas review.89 For federal prisoners,90 the one-year statute-of-
limitations period begins to run on the date on which the latest of the 
following events occurs: 
(1) [T]he date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 
final; 
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion 
created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution 
or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was 
prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized 
by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized 
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 
cases on collateral review; or 
 
 86. §§	101, 105, 110 Stat. at 1217, 1220. State prisoners apply for habeas review using 
28 U.S.C. §	2244, while federal prisoners make their petitions through 28 U.S.C. §	2255. 
The one-year statute of limitations provision is largely the same in both statutory sections. 
Compare §	2244(d)(1), with §	2255(f). 
 87. See supra Section I.A. 
 88. Roby, supra note 82, at 83–84 (“Prior to 1996, there was no formal statute of 
limitations applicable in habeas proceedings; however, ‘state law often imposed timeliness 
requirements.’	” (quoting Lisker v. Knowles, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 
2006))). 
 89. See 28 U.S.C. §	2244(d)(1) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations for state 
prisoners); see also §	2255(f) (mandating a one-year statute of limitations period for 
federal prisoners). 
 90. Because the focal point of this Comment is the Fourth Circuit and its decision not 
to extend the actual innocence exception to the federal prisoner in Jones, the federal 
statute of limitations in §	2255 is most relevant and will serve as the basis for analysis. 
However, the state statute of limitations provisions in §	2244 are virtually identical in 
meaning, although some wording of the provision does differ. Compare §	2244(d)(1), with 
§	2255(f). 
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(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence.91 
In the wake of AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the question 
arose whether innocence could serve as an exception to the firm time 
bar, just as it served as an exception to various procedural bars before 
AEDPA and to those same bars codified by AEDPA. 
II.  OVERCOMING STATUTORY BARS TO HABEAS REVIEW: 
MCQUIGGIN V. PERKINS 
While the three innocence-based exceptions traditionally 
overcame only judge-made bars to habeas review, courts continued to 
apply the exceptions even after AEDPA formally codified the 
procedural bars.92 Although AEDPA’s statutory language does not 
expressly adopt an innocence-based exception, courts continue to see 
innocence differently, allowing certain types of innocence claims to 
overcome AEDPA’s statutory bars to postconviction relief93 based on 
a fundamental concern that innocent persons not be wrongfully 
incarcerated.94 The Supreme Court, for example, has recognized the 
 
 91. §	2255(f). 
 92. See, e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004) (stating, eight years after 
AEDPA, that actual innocence is a “narrow exception to the general rule” that federal 
habeas courts will not hear procedurally defaulted claims unless the petitioner can show 
cause for and prejudice resulting from the default). 
 93. Compare United States v. Denny, 694 F.3d 1185, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(refusing to recognize a noncapital sentence exception to untimely filed habeas petitions 
post-AEDPA), with Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 
162, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2000) (extending the noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s 
statutory bar against federal court review of procedurally defaulted habeas petitions in 
which the petitioner failed to adhere to state procedural rules). 
 94. This concern has been the backdrop behind the actual innocence exception to 
judge-made procedural bars; the creation and application of the exception reflects the 
reality that, although the writ of habeas corpus is focused on correcting procedural defects 
in criminal trials, substantive innocence is a fundamental consideration in habeas review. 
See The Supreme Court, 2012 Term—Leading Cases, 127 HARV. L. REV. 318, 318 (2013). 
Despite courts’ continued concern for substantive innocence, petitioners attempting to 
enter the actual innocence “gateway” must present evidence supporting not only a 
colorable claim of actual innocence, but also the presence of a procedural defect in their 
trial. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013); see also Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (“	‘[A]ctual innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but 
instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise 
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.”). Meeting the procedural default 
requirement is likely relatively easy for actually innocent petitioners. Jordan M. Barry, 
Prosecuting the Exonerated: Actual Innocence and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. 535, 552 n.161 (2012) (“A petitioner who demonstrates that she is actually 
innocent is likely to have an easier time demonstrating that she was damaged by any legal 
infirmities that plagued her proceedings.”). 
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continued application of the conviction innocence and capital 
sentence exceptions to AEDPA’s successiveness prohibition despite 
the fact that it is now a statutory, rather than judge-made, bar.95 In 
McQuiggin v. Perkins, the Supreme Court, for the first time, allowed 
an innocence claim to overcome AEDPA’s statute of limitations. This 
Part discusses McQuiggin’s facts and reasoning as background for 
Part III, which argues that the McQuiggin Court’s rationale, among 
other factors, should apply to the noncapital sentence exception as 
well as the conviction innocence exception.96 
McQuiggin marked the first time the Supreme Court applied the 
judge-made conviction innocence exception to a congressionally 
established statute of limitations.97 The Court’s extension of the 
exception was based in large part on pre-AEDPA innocence 
jurisprudence and the understanding that, though of great 
importance, “the societal interests in finality, comity, and 
conservation of scarce judicial resources” must be weighed against the 
strong “individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary 
[innocence] case.”98 In McQuiggin, the Court decided that the need to 
rectify the incarceration of innocent persons was strong enough to 
overcome even AEDPA’s statute of limitations.99 
The petitioner in McQuiggin, Floyd Perkins, was convicted of 
first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.100 Eleven years later, Perkins filed a habeas 
petition alleging both ineffective assistance of counsel and newly 
discovered evidence proving his innocence.101 This filing undisputedly 
occurred after AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired.102 
Although the Supreme Court had previously recognized that 
petitioners who diligently pursue their rights but face extraordinary 
obstacles to filing a habeas petition might equitably toll the statute of 
 
 95. See, e.g., Dretke, 541 U.S. at 388 (“We have recognized a narrow exception to the 
general rule when the habeas applicant can demonstrate that the alleged constitutional 
error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the underlying 
offense or, in the capital sentencing context, of the aggravating circumstances rendering 
the inmate eligible for the death penalty.”). 
 96. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 97. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1937 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 1932 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). 
 99. Id. (“Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent individual should not 
abate when the impediment is AEDPA’s statute of limitations.”). 
 100. Id. at 1929. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 28 U.S.C. §	2244(d)(1) (2012). 
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limitations,103 Perkins was not eligible for tolling because he was not 
diligent in pursuing his claim.104 Given the unavailability of tolling, the 
Court considered whether Perkins’s conviction innocence claim 
allowed him to bypass the statute of limitations altogether.105 Citing 
the traditionally accepted application of the conviction innocence 
exception to judge-made procedural bars,106 the Court held that 
credible claims of conviction innocence also trigger an exception to 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations.107 
McQuiggin’s holding is, of course, grounded in the facts of the 
case: Perkins claimed conviction innocence, not noncapital sentence 
innocence.108 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that its expansion 
of the conviction innocence exception was not intended to open the 
floodgates of litigation and allow every petitioner claiming conviction 
innocence to do so well after the statute of limitations expires.109 Yet, 
this Comment argues that the fundamental similarity between 
incarcerating an individual for a crime of conviction he did not 
commit and imprisoning a person for a longer period of time based on 
a previous crime that he did not commit requires that the two 
scenarios be treated alike.110 This approach would permit a wrongfully 
incarcerated person to seek habeas review beyond the statute of 
limitations when there is convincing evidence that she is innocent of a 
prior conviction on which her sentence was based.111 
 
 103. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 
408, 418 (2004)) (stating that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations “if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing”). 
 104. The three affidavits that Perkins sought to classify as new evidence of his actual 
innocence of the murder conviction had been in his possession since 1997, 1999, and 2002. 
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1929–30. Perkins did not petition for habeas review until 2008—
almost six years after he obtained the last affidavit tending to prove his innocence—which 
the Court found to demonstrate a lack of diligence. Id. at 1929, 1931. 
 105. Id. at 1931 (“[Perkins] thus seeks an equitable exception to §	2244(d)(1), not an 
extension of the time statutorily prescribed.”). 
 106. Id. at 1931–32. 
 107. Id. at 1933–34. The Court emphasized that its holding was supported by 
precedent. Id. at 1934 (“Our reading of the statute is supported by the Court’s opinion in 
Holland. ‘[E]quitable principles have traditionally governed the substantive law of habeas 
corpus	.	.	.	[and] we will not construe a statute to displace courts’ traditional equitable 
authority absent the clearest command.’	” (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 646)). 
 108. Id. at 1929. 
 109. Id. at 1936 (“The gateway should open only when a petition presents ‘evidence of 
innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial	.	.	.	.’	”) 
(quoting Schlup v. Delo 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 
 110. See infra Part III. 
 111. See infra Section III.B. 
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III.  EXPANDING THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S ACTUAL INNOCENCE OF 
NONCAPITAL SENTENCE EXCEPTION TO AEDPA’S STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
The McQuiggin Court’s foray into applying the judge-made 
conviction innocence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
was a significant step forward in minimizing obstacles to 
postconviction relief. Yet this case does not provide any relief for 
petitioners bringing untimely habeas claims based on a sentence-
innocence theory. This disparate treatment based on the type of 
innocence at issue (conviction versus sentence) fails to acknowledge 
the basic commonality between the two: in both instances, an 
improperly sentenced individual remains incarcerated for a longer 
period of time than warranted based on his crime of conviction and 
criminal history. 
Petitioners arguing for equal treatment of these two types of 
innocence may find a receptive court in the Fourth Circuit. The 
Fourth Circuit’s conditional recognition of the noncapital sentence 
exception, along with the Supreme Court’s rationale in McQuiggin, 
present a confluence of elements that render the court ripe for 
petitioners to argue that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be 
subject to the noncapital sentence exception.112 The Fourth Circuit 
does not provide the same broad opportunity for expanding the 
noncapital sentence exception as the Second Circuit’s liberal 
innocence jurisprudence, but its limits would mitigate concerns over 
expanding the exception, such as the resulting impact on judicial 
efficiency and docket load.113 
This Part addresses the failed attempt to expand the noncapital 
sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations in the Fourth 
Circuit and the remaining opportunity to expand the exception given 
better facts. It then argues that the Fourth Circuit should—based on 
its own precedent and in the interest of justice—allow the noncapital 
sentence exception to overcome AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
A. Jones: A Compelling Argument Doomed by Inapposite Facts 
In United States v. Jones,114 the petitioner argued for an extension 
of the Fourth Circuit’s noncapital sentence exception that would 
allow him to bypass AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The Fourth 
Circuit rejected this argument for two reasons. First, there were facial 
 
 112. See infra Section III.B.2.a. 
 113. See supra Section I.B.2; infra Section IV.B. 
 114. 758 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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distinctions between Jones’s facts and those presented in prior cases 
where the Fourth Circuit invoked the noncapital sentence 
exception.115 Second, prior Fourth Circuit cases allowed the judge-
made exception to overcome a judge-made bar, but did not address 
the potential for innocence to trump a statutory bar.116 Although 
some portions of the Jones opinion reject a noncapital sentence 
exception to the statute of limitations in very broad terms,117 the 
decision does not entirely foreclose the opportunity to expand the 
exception’s scope.118 
1.  The Facts 
Petitioner Torrance Jones was convicted of a nonviolent drug 
offense in federal court119 and sentenced to thirty years (360 months) 
in prison.120 Jones’s sentence was calculated under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines and took into account his criminal history, 
which included two prior convictions under Florida law.121 Jones 
received the minimum sentence within the permissible range for his 
offense level and criminal history category.122 
After Jones received his federal sentence, the Florida state court 
vacated his two prior convictions.123 His 2004 conviction for 
 
 115. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 116. See infra Section III.A.2. 
 117. The majority opinion states, “At bottom, we conclude that McQuiggin does not 
extend to cases in which a movant asserts actual innocence of his sentence, rather than of 
his crime of conviction[,]” seemingly prohibiting future petitioners from attempting to rely 
on this Supreme Court case as a means of extending the actual innocence of noncapital 
sentence exception to statutory bars to review. Jones, 758 F.3d at 586. However, as will be 
addressed infra Section III.A.3, a number of elements suggest that McQuiggin or other 
cases could still form the basis of just such an expansion. 
 118. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 119. Jones was convicted of trafficking seventy-nine kilograms of cocaine and twenty-
six kilograms of cocaine base. The court also found that Jones played a managerial role in 
the crime, which is an aggravating factor at sentencing. Jones, 758 F.3d at 581. 
 120. Id. at 580. 
 121. Id. at 580–81. Jones’s convictions were for: (1) possession of marijuana; and (2) 
possession of a concealed firearm, loitering or prowling, and possession of burglary tools. 
Id. at 581. This sentence was appealed and affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in 1998. United 
States v. Jones, Nos. 97-4083, 97-4084, 97-4107, 1998 WL 761542, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 
1998). 
 122. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones at 3, United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 
579 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-7675). Jones’s conviction required an offense level of forty, and 
he was designated as a criminal history category III. The criminal history category was 
determined by assigning points both for Jones’s two prior state court convictions and for 
the fact that the federal conviction at issue occurred within two years of those prior 
convictions, totaling six points. Id. 
 123. Id. at 4. 
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possession of marijuana was vacated on constitutional grounds,124 
while his 2008 conviction for possession of a concealed firearm was 
vacated on the basis of his factual innocence.125 Had one or both of 
these vacated convictions been excluded from Jones’s criminal history 
calculation at sentencing, Jones would have fallen into a lower 
criminal history category (category I or II, depending on which 
vacated convictions were excluded).126 If both of Jones’s vacated prior 
convictions had been excluded, he would have been classified as a 
criminal history category I and sentenced to 292 to 405 months.127 If 
only one of Jones’s vacated prior convictions had been excluded, he 
would have fallen into criminal history category II and been 
sentenced to anywhere between 324 and 405 months.128 While the 
360-month sentence ultimately imposed did fall within both of these 
lower guideline ranges, had the prior convictions been excluded from 
the calculation, the court could have, in its discretion, sentenced Jones 
to fewer than 360 months in prison.129 
Relying on the vacatur of these prior convictions, Jones filed a 
§	2255 petition for habeas review in 2009, less than one year after his 
second state conviction was vacated and, thus, within AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations.130 But, because Jones had filed a §	2255 petition 
in 2000 (before his state convictions were vacated),131 his 2009 petition 
was denied as successive.132 Jones filed yet another §	2255 motion for 
habeas review in 2012, several years after the state convictions were 
 
 124. Id. at 4–5. The conviction was vacated because of violations of the Fourth and 
Sixth Amendments that occurred incident to Jones’s arrest and trial. This is often 
considered a vacatur on the grounds of legal innocence, as opposed to factual innocence. 
 125. Id. An affidavit stating that Jones had committed no crime on which this 
conviction could be based was submitted to the court and formed the basis of this vacatur. 
As opposed to the Fourth and Sixth Amendment violations on which his first vacatur was 
based, this proceeding was founded on the fact that Jones did not in fact commit the crime 
for which he was convicted. 
 126. Id. at 3–4. 
 127. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 404 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
 128. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 4. 
 129. To follow along with these technical facts, please consult Appendix I, which 
includes a copy of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table. 
 130. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 6–7. This was 
Jones’s second §	2255 motion. The first was filed after Jones’s sentence was imposed, but 
before he obtained the vacaturs of his two Florida convictions. United States v. Jones, 758 
F.3d 579, 580 (4th Cir. 2014).  
 131. This petition was filed in 2000 and based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Jones, 758 F.3d at 580. 
 132. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 5. 
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vacated.133 In this motion, he argued that his 2009 §	2255 motion was 
improperly denied as successive because his state convictions had not 
been vacated at the time of his initial motion in 2000.134 Jones’s 2012 
petition was dismissed as untimely because it was filed after 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired.135 Jones was, however, 
granted a certificate of appealability for this denial because of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin.136 On appeal, Jones claimed 
that the vacatur of his prior state convictions rendered him innocent 
of his 360-month sentence.137 Jones argued for the noncapital 
sentence exception to be extended to AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McQuiggin.138 
2.  The Majority Opinion: Focused on Facial Distinctions 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected Jones’s argument, neatly 
cabining McQuiggin’s application to only those instances in which a 
petitioner “demonstrates actual innocence of his crime of 
conviction.”139 This broad language precludes future defendants from 
attempting to use McQuiggin alone as a basis for expanding the 
noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations.140 
However, the factual distinctions between Jones’s case and other 
cases in which the Fourth Circuit has applied the noncapital sentence 
exception indicate that, given more congruent facts, the court may be 
willing to create an exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations 
based on noncapital sentence innocence.141 
The majority’s decision to reject Jones’s argument for expanding 
the noncapital sentence exception rested largely on facial distinctions 
between Jones’s case, McQuiggin, and Fourth Circuit precedent. The 
first basis for the majority’s refusal to apply McQuiggin in Jones’s 
 
 133. This 2012 §	2255 petition is the central petition in the 2014 Fourth Circuit opinion. 
Id. at 5–6. 
 134. Id. at 6. 
 135. Id. The 2012 §	2255 petition was filed four years after the latest vacatur of Jones’s 
two state convictions, which occurred in 2008, and eight years after the first vacatur, which 
occurred in 2004. The court found that Jones had not filed the petition within one year of 
his having notice that the convictions had been vacated and, therefore, his petition fell 
outside AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Jones, 758 F.3d at 582. 
 136. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 6. 
 137. Id. at 7. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Jones, 758 F.3d at 581. 
 140. See id. at 586. 
 141. See id. at 587 (King, J., concurring). 
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case was the distinction between the types of innocence at issue.142 
While the petitioner in McQuiggin claimed conviction innocence, 
Jones claimed only noncapital sentence innocence.143 The majority 
relied on language from McQuiggin to justify its refusal to extend that 
case’s reasoning beyond conviction innocence. In McQuiggin, Justice 
Ginsburg had justified the conviction innocence exception’s 
expansion by insisting that it would not result in a watershed of 
untimely and traditionally unreviewable habeas petitions, writing, 
“[t]he miscarriage of justice exception	.	.	.	applies to a severely 
confined category: cases in which new evidence shows ‘it is more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the 
petitioner].’	”144 According to the Jones majority, this language 
suggests that McQuiggin applies only to conviction innocence 
claims.145 
The Jones majority also presumed that its disparate treatment of 
these two types of innocence—that of conviction versus that of 
noncapital sentence—was justified because the two give rise to 
“varying degrees of injustice.”146 While “[i]nnocence of conviction 
implicates the notion that a person has been incarcerated for a crime 
he did not commit	.	.	.	a sentencing error does not at all implicate 
guilt.”147 Based on this belief in “varying degrees of injustice[,]”148 a 
Fourth Circuit petitioner who is entirely innocent of the crime for 
which he was convicted can use McQuiggin to seek habeas review 
after the statute of limitations expires; yet, a person who is innocent 
of one of the prior convictions that serves as the basis for his 
enhanced sentence cannot use the same exception to achieve review 
of his improperly calculated and, thus, unjustly imposed sentence. 
 
 142. Id. at 583 (majority opinion) (“[Jones] asks us to apply a rule providing for relief 
based on actual innocence of a crime of conviction to a situation where he is actually 
innocent of a federal sentence.”). 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 584 (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013)). 
 145. As will be discussed infra Section III.B.2.c, this particular line of reasoning from 
McQuiggin’s discussion of actual innocence of conviction could reasonably be applied in 
actual innocence of noncapital sentence claims. For instance, if no reasonable juror could 
have convicted the petitioner of one of her prior convictions because of convincing 
evidence that she was factually innocent of the crime, and her instant sentence was based 
in part of this wrongful prior conviction, it would seem that the exception should apply to 
overcome the statute of limitations just as it does in McQuiggin. Either way, applying the 
McQuiggin exception would allow the court to remedy the unjust incarceration of an 
individual for a crime that she did not commit. 
 146. Jones, 758 F.3d at 584–85. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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As further justification for this disparate treatment, the court 
focused on the conflict between Jones’s proposed application of the 
noncapital sentence exception and the Fourth Circuit’s historical 
application of the same. While the court acknowledged Fourth Circuit 
precedent recognizing and applying the noncapital sentence 
exception, it distinguished those cases from Jones by pointing out that 
prior cases used the exception to overcome judge-made bars to 
review, while Jones sought to use the exception to overcome a 
statutory bar.149 The majority did not address the other Fourth Circuit 
preconditions for applying the noncapital sentence exception.150 
The Jones opinion used these facial distinctions between 
conviction and noncapital sentence innocence, as well as between 
judge-made and statutory bars, to conclude that AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations could not be overridden absent a claim of conviction 
innocence. While these facial distinctions certainly exist and provide a 
sound basis for the Jones decision, this Comment argues that the 
fundamental similarities between conviction and noncapital sentence 
innocence claims justify their similar treatment.151 The two claims 
implicate the very same injustice—not “varying degrees” of it. 
3.  The Jones Concurrence: The Majority’s Missed Opportunity for 
Reform 
Judge King’s brief but significant concurrence in Jones suggests 
that there may still be an opportunity for Fourth Circuit petitioners to 
expand the noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations. In particular, the concurrence suggests that Fourth Circuit 
precedent recognizing and applying the noncapital sentence exception 
could serve as an independent basis for expanding the exception.152 
The concurrence limited its reasoning to distinguishing between 
Jones’s facts and other cases in which the Fourth Circuit has applied 
the noncapital sentence exception.153 Specifically, the court has 
traditionally limited the application of the noncapital sentence 
exception to those cases in which the petitioner was sentenced under 
a habitual or career offender provision.154 According to the 
 
 149. Id. at 586–87 (“Jones does discuss at length three Fourth Circuit cases addressing 
an actual innocence of sentence exception. But, in each case, the exception was raised not 
in the context of a statute of limitations, but rather in the context of a judge-made 
procedural default rule.”). 
 150. For discussion of these preconditions, see infra Section III.A.3. 
 151. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 152. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 153. See infra Section III.B. 
 154. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494–95 (4th Cir. 1999). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 991 (2016) 
2016] VARYING DEGREES OF INNOCENCE? 1017 
concurrence, Jones was not sentenced under such a provision; his 
prior convictions were simply taken into account when his sentence 
was calculated.155 Based on this distinction, Judge King found that the 
noncapital sentence exception was not available in Jones’s case, 
leaving “for another day—and a more appropriate case—the question 
of whether AEDPA’s time limitations foreclose a late-filed claim 
alleging actual innocence of a noncapital (or capital) sentence.”156 The 
concurrence’s more limited reasoning is preferable to the majority’s 
broad holding, which seems to foreclose expansion of the noncapital 
sentence exception not only through McQuiggin, but also through any 
other line of reasoning. This foreclosure was premature and based on 
a flawed conception of the injustices wrought by incarcerating an 
“entirely innocent” person as opposed to a “partially guilty and 
partially innocent” person. 
B. Moving Forward After Jones: Expanding the Noncapital Sentence 
Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations 
Despite the Jones opinion’s broad language,157 the opportunity to 
expand the noncapital sentence exception continues to exist in the 
Fourth Circuit, albeit not through McQuiggin alone. The differences 
between Jones’s case and the facts presented by petitioners who have 
invoked the noncapital sentence exception in prior Fourth Circuit 
cases make Jones a poor case for expanding the exception. But these 
differences do not altogether foreclose the opportunity. The court 
could use its own precedent, its traditional equitable power to invoke 
the exception, and principles of justice and fairness as bases for 
expanding the exception. By focusing on the incongruences of Jones’s 
facts, it is possible to hypothesize about what facts future petitioners 
would need to allege for the Fourth Circuit to expand the noncapital 
sentence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
 
 155. See United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 587 (2014) (King, J., concurring) (“[S]uch 
exception cannot help Jones because he was not sentenced as a habitual offender.”); see 
also id. at 580 (majority opinion) (“[Jones’s] sentence was enhanced by, among other 
things, two prior Florida state court convictions.”). 
 156. Id. at 587 (King, J., concurring). 
 157. Specifically, the majority stated that McQuiggin will not be applied in actual 
innocence of noncapital sentence cases, but will be invoked only when petitioners claim 
actual innocence of their crime of conviction. Id. at 586 (majority opinion) (“At bottom, 
we conclude that McQuiggin does not extend to cases in which a movant asserts actual 
innocence of his sentence, rather than of his crime of conviction.”). 
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1.  Necessary Facts 
The outcome in Jones suggests two distinct facts that future 
petitioners must present to persuade the Fourth Circuit to expand the 
noncapital innocence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations: 
(1) sentencing pursuant to a habitual or career offender provision; 
and (2) a claim of factual, as opposed to legal, innocence. 
First, a court must have sentenced the petitioner as a “habitual 
offender.”158 This term is rife with ambiguities. There is no expressly 
named “habitual offender statute,” although numerous statutory 
schemes include a defendant’s criminal history as part of the 
sentencing calculation. For instance, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
require federal judges to include a defendant’s criminal history in 
determining the range of available sentences.159 Similarly, calculating 
a defendant’s sentence under North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing 
scheme involves totaling the defendant’s “points” based on prior 
convictions to determine his prior record level. This level, along with 
the offense class for the crime of conviction, controls the available 
sentencing range.160 
Other sentencing mechanisms emphasize the defendant’s prior 
convictions beyond simply including them as an element of the 
sentencing scheme. By exclusion, it is clear that these are the 
statutory schemes that the Fourth Circuit speaks of when referencing 
habitual and career offender sentencing provisions.161 One of these 
schemes is the federal career offender enhancement. A defendant 
may be treated as a career offender based on his prior commission 
and conviction of certain offenses when certain factors are present.162 
If deemed a career offender, the defendant is subjected to a 
 
 158. Id. at 587 (King, J., concurring). 
 159. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §	4A1.1 (US. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
 160. N.C. SENTENCING & POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N, N.C. STRUCTURED 
SENTENCING TRAINING & REFERENCE MANUAL 4 fig. A, 6–10 (N.C. SENTENCING & 
POLICY ADVISORY COMM’N 2009). 
 161. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 580, 587 (4th Cir. 2014) (King, J., concurring) 
(distinguishing the sentencing scheme used to sentence Jones, which merely took prior 
conviction into account, from true “habitual offender provisions”). 
 162. These factors are: (1) the convicted person must be eighteen or older at the time 
of the instant offense; (2) the instant conviction must be a felony crime of violence or 
felony controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant must have at least two prior 
convictions for felony crime of violence or controlled substance offenses. OFFICE OF GEN. 
COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIMER 7 (2013); see also 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §	4B1.1. 
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significantly enhanced sentence.163 The Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”)164 also provides for an enhanced sentence based on prior 
convictions and the convicted person’s presumed undeterrability from 
a life of crime.165 
Merely being sentenced under a statutory scheme that takes 
prior convictions into account is insufficient to invoke the noncapital 
sentence exception in the Fourth Circuit. This is one of the primary 
differences between Jones’s facts and those in prior cases where the 
exception has been invoked. Jones was not treated as a career 
offender or sentenced under the ACCA; rather, his prior state 
convictions were simply taken into account to calculate his 
appropriate sentencing range.166 The concurrence emphasizes this 
difference as one basis for declining to expand the exception in 
Jones.167 
Second, a petitioner attempting to expand the noncapital 
sentence exception must ground her claim in factual innocence of a 
prior conviction, which involves evidence showing that the petitioner 
did not in fact commit the crime, as opposed to legal innocence, which 
is based on a constitutional or procedural error at trial.168 This is 
consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Mikalajunas, which 
restricts the noncapital sentence exception to those instances in which 
the petitioner presents a claim of factual innocence and prohibits its 
use when the petitioner asserts mere legal innocence.169 This is yet 
another distinction between Jones’s facts and those presented by 
previous petitioners who successfully invoked the noncapital sentence 
exception. While one of Jones’s prior convictions was vacated due to 
factual innocence, the other vacatur was granted due to constitutional 
 
 163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §	4B1.1. In addition to mandating an 
enhanced sentencing range, a defendant sentenced as a career offender must be 
considered as having a criminal history category of VI, regardless of what category would 
be appropriate absent treatment as a career offender. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 162, at 8. 
 164. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2185 (1984). 
 165. See 18 U.S.C. §	924(e) (2012). The ACCA applies when a defendant has been 
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, §	922(g), and also has three prior 
convictions for any “violent felony or	.	.	.	serious drug offense[.]” §	924(e)(1). The ACCA 
mandates that eligible defendants be sentenced to at least fifteen years in prison due to 
their continued commitment to breaking the law. Id. 
 166. See Jones, 758 F.3d at 580. 
 167. Id. at 587 (King, J., concurring). 
 168. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A] 
petitioner must demonstrate actual factual innocence of the offense of conviction, i.e., that 
petitioner did not commit the crime of which he was convicted; this standard is not 
satisfied by a showing that a petitioner is legally, but not factually, innocent.”). 
 169. Id. 
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errors at trial.170 Even if Jones had been sentenced under a career 
offender provision, the only basis for his request to expand the 
noncapital sentence exception would have been the conviction 
vacated for factual innocence. 
In sum, a petitioner seeking to expand the noncapital sentence 
exception in the Fourth Circuit must base her request for habeas 
review on factual innocence of one or more of the prior convictions 
that formed the basis for her sentencing as a habitual or career 
offender.171 The petitioner must show that she did not in fact commit 
one of the crimes of which she was previously convicted; she will not 
be able to rely on legal innocence to expand the exception.172 
2.  In the Interest of Justice: The Argument for Expanding the 
Noncapital Sentence Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations 
While there are significant facial differences between the 
McQuiggin Court’s decision to expand the conviction innocence 
exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations and any future decision 
by the Fourth Circuit to permit the noncapital sentence exception to 
do the same, the implications for fairness and justice that the two 
scenarios present are practical equivalents. A petitioner who is 
factually innocent of past crimes that formed the basis for his prison 
sentence should have habeas review available to him beyond the 
mere 365-day period permitted by AEDPA. Although allowing the 
noncapital sentence exception to apply to AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations might condone a lack of diligence in pursuing claims and 
add to federal courts’ already substantial caseload,173 failing to expand 
the exception allows individuals to be incarcerated on the basis of 
crimes that they did not commit. The balance of the scales of justice, 
Fourth Circuit precedent, and the purpose behind the innocence 
exceptions weigh in favor of expanding the noncapital sentence 
exception. 
a. Fourth Circuit Precedent 
Allowing the noncapital sentence exception to override 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations would be consistent with Fourth 
Circuit precedent, which strikes a unique balance between liberal 
 
 170. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 4–5. 
 171. See Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 494. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See infra Section IV.B. 
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application of the exception and complete refusal to recognize it.174 
The Fourth Circuit is one of a handful of courts that has recognized 
and adopted the exception, as well as placed conditions on its 
application.175 Its decision to recognize the exception acknowledges 
that the incarceration of an individual for a crime she did not commit, 
whether it is the crime of conviction or a prior conviction, is simply 
unjust.176 
Moreover, the Jones majority’s claim that conviction and 
noncapital sentence innocence implicate “varying degrees of 
injustice”177 runs contrary to Fourth Circuit precedent. The Fourth 
Circuit has long insisted that imprisonment of an innocent person is a 
manifest injustice regardless of the type of innocence at issue.178 
Recognizing that incarceration for a longer period of time than 
warranted is as much an injustice as incarceration for any length of 
time when none is warranted, the court has stated, “[t]hree years of a 
man’s life is not a trifling thing.”179 Three years of life in prison for a 
crime that the petitioner never committed and three years in prison 
added to a deserved sentence on the basis of a crime that the 
petitioner never committed are effectively the same—the end result is 
simply three years unjustly spent in prison. This common result in 
both conviction and noncapital sentence innocence cases lends strong 
credence to allowing both doctrines to overcome AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations. 
b. The Purposes of Habeas Review and Fundamental Similarities 
In addition to Fourth Circuit precedent, the stated purposes of 
habeas review also weigh in favor of applying the noncapital sentence 
 
 174. As discussed supra Section I.B.3, the conditions that petitioners must meet before 
invoking the actual innocence of noncapital sentence exception make this court a prime 
candidate for expansion of the exception. 
 175. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 176. See United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing the Supreme 
Court’s expansion of the exception to the capital sentence context and applying the same 
logic to noncapital cases, stating that “[e]xcept for the obvious difference in the severity of 
the sentences, we see little difference between holding that a defendant can be innocent of 
the acts required to enhance a sentence in a death case and applying a parallel rationale in 
non-capital cases”). 
 177. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584–85 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 178. See, e.g., Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893 (recognizing the actual innocence of noncapital 
sentence exception). 
 179. United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996). In Ford, the Fourth 
Circuit vacated and remanded the appellant’s sentence to the district court with 
instructions to impose a shorter sentence because the court had improperly calculated the 
appellant’s prior conviction level, despite the fact that the appellant failed to object to this 
error during sentencing. Id. 
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exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Habeas review was 
designed to thwart just the type of “unconstitutional loss of liberty”180 
that the noncapital sentence exception prevents. After all, the central 
concept of the exception is that it should “appl[y] where a petitioner 
is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime of which he was convicted or the 
penalty which was imposed.”181 Although noncapital sentence 
innocence cases do not present facts in which the entirety of the 
sentence is wrongfully imposed, and the consequences of the 
improper sentence do not include death, it is contrary to our sense of 
justice to incarcerate an innocent individual for even a day longer 
than he deserves.182 
While the Supreme Court has recognized the equivalent nature 
of the conviction and sentence innocence exceptions only in the 
context of the death penalty,183 it rings true for noncapital sentence 
cases as well. Where a person is innocent of the prior convictions that 
serve as the basis of her sentence, she is “actually innocent” of that 
sentence. The same is true of a person who did not commit the 
aggravating factors that led to the imposition of the death penalty: he 
is “actually innocent” of his capital sentence.184 Although there is 
certainly more finality inherent in the death penalty, the basic 
principle remains the same. An individual should not be deprived of 
his liberty for a longer period of time or in a more extreme way when 
such an enhancement is unwarranted. To decide otherwise is an 
injustice and a failure to preserve the constitutional protection against 
unlawful incarceration guaranteed by the writ of habeas corpus. 
Both the conviction and noncapital sentence innocence 
exceptions serve the fundamental purpose of habeas review because 
they attempt to rectify the same injustice: unconstitutional 
incarceration. Although a petitioner claiming noncapital sentence 
innocence is admittedly guilty of her crime of conviction, failure to 
apply the exception allows her to be incarcerated for some period of 
time on the basis of a crime she did not commit. This equivalent 
injustice alone is reason for expanding the noncapital sentence 
exception to instances in which petitioners who credibly claim factual 
innocence seek habeas review after the statute of limitations has 
expired. As in McQuiggin, these petitioners are potentially 
 
 180. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491–92 n.31 (1976). 
 181. Sawyer v. Whitley, 555 U.S. 333, 333 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id; see also supra Section I.B. 
 184. See United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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incarcerated on an improper basis and should be entitled to review 
regardless of when they file their claims. 
c. Individual Obstacles and the Convoluted Habeas Review 
Process 
Another similarity between the conviction, capital sentence, and 
noncapital sentence exceptions is that each distinct doctrine functions 
within the same, complex system of habeas corpus. Sanctioning 
different treatment of the statute of limitations period depending on 
which exception a petitioner alleges is a failure to recognize the 
practical, and often harsh, reality of the habeas system.185 
Habeas petitioners must navigate a system of habeas review that 
is often maligned as far too convoluted. “Habeas procedures have 
come to resemble a maze of mirrors	.	.	.	.”186 Even trained attorneys 
must be acutely aware of the various timetables governing habeas and 
the intertwined statutory and judge-made intricacies of the 
successiveness doctrine.187 Giving petitioners only one year in which 
to file petitions for federal habeas review188 is already an arguably 
unrealistic deadline.189 
If the habeas system is deemed a complicated maze for 
practitioners, consider petitioners who navigate the system pro se.190 
Many startling statistics on the prevalence of mental illness, low IQ 
scores, illiteracy, and below-average educational levels within the 
state and federal prison populations191 suggest that pro se petitioners 
 
 185. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 492–93 n.31. 
 186. Michael A. Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of 
the Proposed Six-Month Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State 
Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 451, 489–90 (1991). 
 187. See id. 
 188. 28 U.S.C. §	2244(d)(1) (2012). However, the one-year statute of limitations is 
tolled while the petitioner pursues any state appellate or habeas review proceedings. 
§	2244(d)(2). 
 189. Congress itself has recognized that habeas corpus law has become increasingly 
complex, for courts as well as for petitioners. H.R. REP. NO. 103-470, at 3 (1994) (“In 
recent years, the practice and procedures in Federal habeas corpus have become 
extremely complex—taking the resources of the Federal courts, delaying final adjudication 
of petitioners’ claims, and creating friction with the State courts.”). For a more complete 
discussion of the complicated and time consuming habeas process, see generally Mello & 
Duffy, supra note 186. While this article addresses these topics in the context of a 
previously proposed six-month time limit on state prisoners’ filing habeas petition claims 
after obtaining counsel, its dialogue concerning the pitfalls of strict time limits on habeas 
review is instructive for AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations as well. 
 190. Mello & Duffy, supra note 186, at 489–90 (“The doctrine can ‘operate as a trap for 
the uneducated and indigent pro se prisoner-applicant.’	”). 
 191. For instance, a 1982 study in Florida revealed that more than half of the state’s 
inmates were “functionally illiterate.” Id. at 481. For a more complete discussion of the 
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face serious obstacles when seeking habeas review. As the Fourth 
Circuit itself noted, “[c]ertainly a prisoner, unversed in the law and 
the methods of legal research, will need more time or more assistance 
than the trained lawyer in exploring his case.”192 AEDPA’s one-year 
statute of limitations places these petitioners under an unreasonable 
time crunch, especially given the complicated nature of habeas law 
and the institutional barriers faced by so many inmates. Allowing 
conviction innocence claims to overcome the statute of limitations 
mitigates this problem, but refusing to do the same in sentence 
innocence cases results in inequitable treatment of inmates who face 
the same obstacles to asserting their constitutional rights. 
In addition, it may be even more difficult for an inmate to 
discover that he has a cause of action for noncapital sentence 
innocence than it is for him to comprehend that conviction innocence 
renders a sentence wrongful. The concept of being entirely innocent 
of a crime is presumably easier to grasp than an understanding that 
the law imposes enhanced sentences on those with prior convictions 
and that innocence of a prior conviction could result in a reduced 
sentence. In other words, innocence of a prior conviction requires a 
degree of knowledge of the law and sentencing schemes, whereas 
being entirely innocent of a crime of conviction gives rise to a sense of 
injustice even absent knowledge of the legal system. A petitioner 
without legal counsel may be unaware of and slower to understand 
that there are options available to vacate prior convictions and then 
seek habeas review, particularly within a one-year period.193 This level 
of difficulty is only exacerbated if the petitioner is also dealing with 
one of the common barriers, such as mental illness or illiteracy, 
mentioned above. These petitioners, just like their wrongfully 
convicted counterparts, should have access to a gateway through 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
Fourth Circuit precedent, the purposes of habeas review, the 
fundamental similarities between conviction and sentence innocence 
claims, and the institutional and individual obstacles to habeas review 
weigh strongly in favor of allowing credible noncapital sentence 
 
various mental, educational, and other institutional obstacles confronted by pro se 
defendants, see id. at 481–88. 
 192. Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 
(finding that stringent restrictions on the amount of time prisoners could spend in the 
prison library were within the bounds of providing prisoners with meaningful access to the 
courts only if prisoners were given access to trained research assistants). 
 193. See id. 
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innocence claims to be brought even after AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations expires. 
IV.  CONTEMPLATING AND ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS 
While strong fairness and justice concerns weigh in favor of 
creating an exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations on the basis 
of noncapital sentence innocence, such an exception would 
admittedly present practical and administrative challenges. Many of 
these challenges can be minimized or eliminated by imposing 
conditions on the exception’s application. The challenges that remain 
are simply the unavoidable and warranted consequences of allowing 
petitioners to access the judicial system to remedy their unjust 
sentences. This Part addresses several concerns raised by opponents 
to expanding the exception and then proposes solutions to mitigate 
these concerns. 
A. Undue Expansion of the Original Innocence Exception 
The most significant argument against expanding the noncapital 
sentence exception is that doing so overly broadens the scope of what 
was intended to be a “	‘narrow’ exception.”194 In numerous cases, 
courts have emphasized that the innocence exception is only to be 
applied when there is evidence of the petitioner’s innocence such that 
no reasonable jury could have convicted her of the crime.195 While it is 
true that expanding the noncapital sentence exception would be a 
further expansion of the original conviction innocence exception, this 
expansion is warranted on the basis of fairness and justice. Although 
any expansion of the exception will make it available to a greater 
number of petitioners, the exception can be construed narrowly and 
imbued with requirements that are just as stringent as those imposed 
on conviction innocence cases. Such a construction mitigates concerns 
for the courts’ scarce resources and better preserves the original 
intent of the innocence exception as a limited doctrine. 
 
 194. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992). 
 195. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013) (“The miscarriage of 
justice exception, we underscore, applies to a severely confined category: cases in which 
new evidence shows ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 
convicted [the petitioner].’	” (alteration in original) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
329 (1995))); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (“A petitioner does not meet the 
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new 
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). 
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For example, the rule for the noncapital sentence exception 
could include a prejudice requirement. This requirement could state 
that, for the noncapital sentence exception to apply, there can be no 
overlap in the relevant sentencing guidelines ranges: the sentence the 
defendant improperly received and the range in which he should have 
been sentenced. In other words, for the noncapital sentence exception 
to be available, the appropriate sentence (without any improperly 
included prior convictions) must be a length of time that is lower than 
the minimum sentence available in the guidelines range in which the 
petitioner was wrongfully sentenced.196  
Such a requirement would keep petitioners like Jones from 
accessing the exception. In Jones, the petitioner’s sentencing range, 
taking into account his later-vacated crimes, was 360 months to life in 
prison.197 Had the later-vacated crimes been left out of the sentencing 
calculation, his sentencing range would have been either 292 to 405 
months (if both prior convictions were omitted) or 324 to 405 months 
(if only one prior conviction was omitted).198 Jones could have, in the 
court’s discretion, been given the same 360-month sentence even if 
one or both of his prior convictions were excluded from the 
sentencing calculation. Under a prejudice rule, the fact that there was 
a possibility for Jones to be sentenced to the incarceration period he 
ultimately received would mean that he suffered no demonstrable 
prejudice and would not be eligible for application of the noncapital 
sentence exception. A prejudice requirement would, however, 
remedy the sentences of prisoners like the petitioner in Maybeck. 
There, had the court not erred by improperly sentencing the 
petitioner as a career offender, his sentencing range would have been 
bounded by a maximum sentence lower than the minimum sentence 
in the career offender range in which he was improperly placed.199  
 
 196. Use Appendix I to follow along with this concrete example. A prejudice 
requirement would allow a petitioner sentenced to forty-six to fifty-seven months based on 
a criminal history category of IV and an offense level of nineteen to use the noncapital 
sentence exception to achieve habeas review and resentencing if the removal of a prior 
conviction of which he was factually innocent would reduce his criminal history category 
to II and, thus, reduce his properly available sentencing range to thirty-three to forty-one 
months. The exception would apply here because the high end of this reduced sentencing 
range does not reach the low end of the original sentencing range. 
 197. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 198. Opening Brief of Appellant Torrance Jones, supra note 122, at 4. 
 199. Had the petitioner been properly sentenced, the maximum sentence in the 
appropriate range would have been 165 months. With the sentencing court’s error of 
classifying the petitioner as a career offender, the minimum sentence within the range was 
168 months. United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 894 (4th Cir. 1994). 
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Setting a high evidentiary bar is another means of ensuring that 
the noncapital sentence exception is not unduly expanded. In 
conviction innocence cases, the Supreme Court requires the 
petitioner to present clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable jury would have found her guilty had the newly discovered 
evidence been presented at trial. Similarly, for the capital sentence 
exception to apply, the petitioner must prove that no reasonable jury 
could have found that he committed the aggravating factors that 
resulted in the imposition of the death penalty.200 To satisfy this 
proposed heightened evidentiary threshold, petitioners would likely 
need to present some concrete evidence—more than simply a 
statement or a single witness announcing the petitioner’s innocence. 
DNA, other physical evidence, and evidence of vacaturs already 
granted in the jurisdiction of conviction would likely satisfy this 
standard. This heightened evidentiary standard is likely to reduce the 
feared flood of litigation resulting from an expansion of the exception 
to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
An additional way to condition application of the exception and 
avoid its undue expansion is to limit the eligible petitioners to those 
sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act as career 
offenders.201 According to a U.S. Sentencing Commission report from 
2012, of the 84,173 cases reported to the Commission in 2012, only 
2232 involved defendants sentenced as career offenders.202 Allowing 
only career offenders to use the noncapital sentence exception would 
drastically reduce the number of petitioners able to use the exception 
and the types of instances in which it could be invoked, keeping it 
nearer its original scope. A petitioner limit is already embedded in 
 
 200. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 506 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) (“We	.	.	.	hold that to show 
‘actual innocence’ one must show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a 
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the 
death penalty under the applicable state law.”). Congress has also selected the clear and 
convincing evidence standard as the evidentiary standard in the instances in which it has 
codified a modified miscarriage of justice exception, as in the case of second or successive 
petitions. 28 U.S.C. §	2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 201. The Fourth Circuit has already presumably done just this, according to the 
reasoning in Jones. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2014); see also supra 
Section I.C.3. Again, placing this limit on the type of improperly imposed sentences 
eligible for review under the noncapital sentence exception beyond the statute of 
limitations period is not an attempt at achieving perfect justice—such a proposal would 
include no technical or procedural limits. Rather, this proposal is an attempt to suggest 
plausible mechanisms for assuaging opponents’ concerns that expanding the noncapital 
sentence exception would result in an unbearable flood of litigation. 
 202. Quick Facts: Career Offenders, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION (2014), http://www
.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Career
_Offender_FY14.pdf [http://perma.cc/YB3Y-QSCB]. 
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Fourth Circuit precedent,203 making the circuit a particularly ideal 
setting for expanding the exception in a manner that preserves its 
original intent as an exception of limited application.204 Under this 
scheme, only those petitioners sentenced as career offenders because 
of one or more prior convictions of which they were factually 
innocent would be eligible for application of the exception.205 
B. Administrability and Finality 
In addition to concerns over expanding the exception beyond its 
original purpose, there are potentially adverse administrative 
implications arising from allowing the noncapital sentence exception 
to bypass AEDPA’s statute of limitations. By widening the actual 
innocence gateway, courts may open themselves up to a flood of 
litigation. If there is effectively no statute of limitations on these 
claims, then the court will be required to consider every habeas 
petition brought on the basis of conviction or noncapital sentence 
innocence, no matter how long the petitioner knew about the facts on 
which the claim is based. After McQuiggin, some suggest that “each 
time an untimely petitioner claims innocence—and how many 
prisoners asking to be let out of jail do not?—the district court will be 
obligated to expend limited judicial resources wading into the murky 
merits of the petitioner’s innocence claim.”206 This would divert the 
courts’ time, funds, and energy away from “primary disputes”207 and 
toward adjudicating habeas petitions. 
These administrative problems will, admittedly, be more 
pronounced if the actual innocence gateway through AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations is opened to noncapital sentence innocence 
claims. Yet, this Comment argues that there is no higher use of our 
justice system than to uphold the right to be free from 
unconstitutional incarceration.208 There can be no better use of our 
judicial resources, scarce though they are, than to ensure that 
innocent persons are not deprived of their liberty, to correct unjust 
misapplications of the law, and to promote public confidence in the 
judiciary by acknowledging and righting past wrongs.209 
 
 203. Jones, 758 F.3d at 587 (finding that, because Jones “was not sentenced as a 
habitual offender[,]” he could not take advantage of the noncapital sentence exception). 
 204. See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 494–95 (1999) (declining to 
broaden Maybeck’s holding to apply the exception whenever a guideline is misapplied). 
 205. Id. 
 206. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1942 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 207. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991). 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	9, cl. 2 (establishing the right of habeas review). 
 209. See United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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At a more practical level, the cost to a court of holding a 
resentencing hearing is less than “the annual cost to taxpayers of 
keeping people in prison who should no longer be there.”210 While 
maintaining prisoners in prison facilities during the resentencing 
process certainly continues to impose a burden on the fisc, 
presumably the resentencing process will be much shorter, at least in 
most cases, than allowing the wrongfully sentenced prisoner to finish 
out her sentence. Furthermore, there are means of protecting scarce 
judicial resources other than refusing to expand the noncapital 
sentence exception. For instance, a postconviction bargaining or 
mediation process could be implemented. Such a process would allow 
prisoners claiming conviction or sentence innocence to bring their 
evidence to the Attorney General or District Attorney and engage in 
a dialogue over whether the sentence should be reduced. There are 
certainly instances in which both parties agree that the petitioner has 
been wrongfully convicted or improperly sentenced;211 especially in 
these cases, the parties could agree on a solution to the improperly 
imposed enhancement and present the results of the negotiation 
(presumably a reduced sentence) to the court for approval. Instances 
of successful mediation would eliminate the need for courts to expend 
resources hearing evidence, making findings, and rendering a 
judgment. This may be a practically viable model today when 
wrongful conviction watchdog groups and prosecutors have begun to 
work toward a common goal of identifying and correcting wrongful 
convictions.212 
In addition to administrative concerns, expanding the noncapital 
sentence exception could undermine finality. This consequence, too, 
requires a balancing act—weighing the legitimacy that finality lends 
the court system against the need to correct injustices like wrongful 
conviction and unjust sentencing. As former Fourth Circuit Judge 
Murnaghan wrote, “I do not believe that the state’s interest in finality 
outweighs even one year of a man’s life[.]”213 While it is true that 
 
 210. Spencer v. United States, 727 F.3d 1076, 1091 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 497 (1999) (“All agree that, 
without a doubt, Appellees do not qualify for the sentencing enhancement which they 
received.”) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
 212. For example, prosecutors’ offices in Los Angeles, Brooklyn, Dallas, Manhattan, and 
Washington, D.C. have formed wrongful conviction units solely to investigate and remedy 
wrongful convictions. Marisa Gerber, L.A. County D.A. Jackie Lacey to Unveil Details on 
Wrongful-Conviction Unit, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/local/lanow/la-me-ln-conviction-integrity-unit-20150629-story.html [http://perma.cc/M9FE-
Z7TS]. 
 213. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 497 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
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finality is an ideal toward which the justice system should strive, it 
provides no excuse for allowing an individual to be incarcerated for a 
crime that she did not commit. And, in situations in which the 
petitioner has been properly convicted (both of prior crimes and the 
crime at issue) and accurately sentenced, finality will be unaffected by 
an expansion of the noncapital sentence exception. 
C. Separation of Powers 
As Justice Scalia recognized and criticized in McQuiggin, 
creating, or in this case expanding, a judge-made exception to 
overcome a legislatively created statute of limitations presents 
separation of powers concerns.214 Until McQuiggin, judge-made 
exceptions in habeas law had only been permitted to overcome judge-
made bars—the court overruling the court itself.215 Using the 
exception to undermine Congress’s actions could be viewed as the 
judicial branch overstepping its bounds by undermining the stated 
intent and effect of legislation.216 Although separation of powers is a 
serious constitutional concern, the need for comity and unyielding 
respect for the boundaries between the branches of federal 
government must be balanced with other issues of grave 
constitutional concern, such as the unconstitutional incarceration of 
innocent individuals.217 The Court has stated that the appropriate 
balance gives greater weight to individual liberty when there is an 
unconstitutional taking of life or liberty through unjust 
incarceration,218 indicating that a separation of powers objection 
should yield in the face of a credible conviction or sentence innocence 
claim. Furthermore, petitioning the legislature would likely be 
ineffective in this particular context. The issue of wrongful 
incarceration is unlikely to be at the forefront of broad public 
concern, and those who are most detrimentally affected by the 
problem—incarcerated felons with enhanced sentences based on their 
 
 214. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1937 (2013) (“Never before ha[s the Court] 
applied the exception to circumvent a categorical statutory bar to relief.”) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1938 (stating that the “free-and-easy approach” of modifying judge-made 
doctrines to overcome judge-made procedural bars at will “has no place where a statutory 
bar to habeas relief is at issue”). 
 217. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (noting the importance of balancing 
the acknowledged need for comity among the various branches of government with the 
“individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case”). 
 218. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (insisting that, though important, the 
emphasis on comity “must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust 
incarceration”). 
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criminal history—are often disenfranchised and unable to vote for 
legislators likely to raise the issue in Washington.219 
Furthermore, Congress likely did not intend to abridge the 
courts’ liberal treatment of innocence claims when it passed AEDPA 
and its accompanying statute of limitations.220 The Supreme Court 
and lower courts have applied the innocence exceptions after 
AEDPA’s passage without Congress issuing corrective legislation.221 
Some argue that Congress did address innocence in its codification of 
the statute of limitations. They suggest that the statute of limitations 
supplants the traditional innocence exceptions as created and applied 
by courts.222 According to proponents of this argument, AEDPA does 
not foreclose review based on innocence claims, but simply requires 
that these claims be brought within one year of the time at which the 
facts underlying those claims could reasonably have been 
discovered.223 
Yet, as Justice Ginsburg made clear in McQuiggin, the statute of 
limitations is not specific to innocence claims.224 Section 
2244(d)(1)(D) allows the statute of limitations period to begin 
running on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence.”225 There is no limitation on this provision that allows it 
to apply only when a petitioner claims actual innocence.226 
Additionally, the innocence exceptions do not contain a diligence 
requirement, unlike §	2244.227 Rather than replacing the innocence 
exceptions with §	2244’s modified, heightened, and less specific 
standard, Congress likely intended for the innocence exceptions to 
 
 219. SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (Apr. 2014) (“[Forty-eight] states and the District of Colombia prohibit voting 
while incarcerated for a felony offense.”). 
 220. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932 (“The miscarriage of justice exception, our 
decisions bear out, survived AEDPA’s passage.”). 
 221. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 558 (1998) (“The miscarriage of 
justice standard is altogether consistent	.	.	.	with AEDPA’s central concern that the merits 
of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong showing of 
factual innocence.”). 
 222. See, e.g., McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1939 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 223. See 28 U.S.C. §	2244(d)(1) (2012) (explaining the moments at which AEDPA’s 
one-year statute of limitations begins to run for various actual situations). 
 224. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1932–33. 
 225. §	2244(d)(1). 
 226. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1933 (explaining that the continued application of the 
miscarriage of justice exception does not render §	2254(d)(1)(D) superfluous and 
therefore violate accepted principles of statutory interpretation). 
 227. See id. (finding that §	2244(d)(1)(D) is “modestly more stringent [than the 
miscarriage of justice exception] (because it requires diligence)”). 
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have continued efficacy under appropriate factual circumstances.228 
Courts have historically exercised substantial control over habeas law, 
and this traditional equitable power can only be overcome by the 
“clearest command” from Congress.229 While AEDPA may contain 
alternative mechanisms and timelines governing habeas review, there 
is no clear command that federal courts abandon the established 
innocence exceptions.230 Thus, courts should continue to apply and 
expand the exceptions as appropriate until Congress issues a clear 
command to the contrary. 
D. Jones’s Foreclosure of Applying McQuiggin in the Sentence 
Innocence Context 
Though the reasons for and means of responsibly extending 
McQuiggin’s reasoning to the noncapital sentence exception abound, 
the Fourth Circuit foreclosed this particular route of expansion 
through its broad language in Jones.231 However, McQuiggin is not 
the sole route to achieve the exception’s expansion. In particular, 
United States v. Begay232 provides an alternate means of bypassing the 
McQuiggin dead-end created by Jones. In Begay, the Supreme Court 
redefined many crimes that had previously been classified as crimes 
of violence as outside the definition of “crime of violence” under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender provision.233  
The Seventh Circuit used Begay as the basis for postconviction 
relief in the face of procedural bars to habeas review in Narvaez v. 
United States.234 Applying Begay, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
petitioner who was wrongfully sentenced as a career offender because 
of the improper classification of one or more of his prior convictions 
as crimes of violence could use the noncapital sentence exception to 
overcome procedural bars to collateral review.235 Seventh Circuit 
 
 228. Id. at 1934. 
 229. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010). 
 230. McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1934. 
 231. United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 586 (4th Cir. 2014) (“At bottom, we conclude 
that McQuiggin does not extend to cases in which a movant asserts actual innocence of his 
sentence, rather than of his crime of conviction.”). 
 232. 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 233. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008); see also UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §	4B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 234. 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 235. For a thorough discussion of Narvaez and its application of Begay, see Greg 
Siepel, The Wrong Kind of Innocence: Why United States v. Begay Warrants the Extension 
of “Actual Innocence” to Include Erroneous, Noncapital Sentences, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 
665 (2013). This article also addresses the virtues of using Begay to recognize the actual 
innocence of noncapital sentence in circuits that have not yet done so. Id. at 696–99. 
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petitioners whose sentences took into account prior crimes of 
violence that were later deemed outside the scope of that category by 
Begay can now seek habeas review using the noncapital sentence 
exception without concern for untimeliness or successiveness.236 
Although this rule is limited in a number of ways,237 its creation 
“seems to suggest that serving an erroneously enhanced sentence is 
equivalent to being punished for a non-existent crime.”238 
While Narvaez is limited in scope to procedural bars, its 
reasoning could be applied to AEDPA’s statute of limitations in a 
particular set of factual situations. For those petitioners whose 
sentences were rendered unlawful by Begay, the court could 
recognize that their noncapital sentence innocence should allow them 
to seek habeas review after the statute of limitations expires. 
Otherwise, these prisoners will continue to serve “sentences that are 
clearly erroneous” in light of Begay.239 While such a rule would not 
aid petitioners whose sentences were not imposed under the crime of 
violence rule,240 it would begin to reform a system that currently 
leaves wrongfully sentenced inmates little recourse. Just as the 
Seventh Circuit applied Begay in Narvaez, the Fourth Circuit could 
use Begay to expand the noncapital sentence exception to the statute 
of limitations in all instances where a habeas petitioner was 
previously sentenced under the now void definition of “crime of 
violence.” This is not a perfectly just or ideal solution because it 
excludes petitioners who are innocent of prior convictions that were 
not erroneously classified as crimes of violence under the ACCA. It 
is, however, a step in the right direction. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether a person is incarcerated for a crime that she did not 
commit, or is imprisoned for a longer period of time based on a crime 
that she did not commit, the result is the same—she is wrongfully 
 
 236. See id. at 687–88. 
 237. For instance, the rule only applies to petitioners who were sentenced before the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which held that the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory. Hawkins v. United States, 706 
F.3d 820, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2013). The rule also applies only to petitioners whose sentences 
exceed the statutory maximum allowable in the proper range—the one in which they 
would have been sentenced had one or more of their prior convictions not unlawfully been 
taken into account. See Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 630. 
 238. See Siepel, supra note 235, at 687. 
 239. See id. at 700. 
 240. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §	4B1.1. (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
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sentenced and unconstitutionally incarcerated. In McQuiggin, the 
Supreme Court recognized that AEDPA’s statute of limitations must 
take a backseat when a petitioner presents a convincing claim of 
conviction innocence. The same reasoning rings true in sentence 
innocence claims: when a petitioner presents a convincing claim that 
he is innocent of a prior conviction that formed the basis of his 
sentence, he should be able to access the courts and pursue a proper 
sentence. Although a perfectly just system would impose no 
conditions on this access to relief from wrongfully imposed noncapital 
sentences, limits like a prejudice requirement and a heightened 
evidentiary standard could be imposed to assuage the concerns of 
those who believe that expanding the exception will result in a 
crippling flood of frivolous claims.241 
Expanding the noncapital sentence exception to AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations will certainly entail increased litigation and 
administrative obstacles. Yet, 
[w]e cannot casually ignore [unjust incarceration] because of an 
overly strict adherence to technical requirements. No court of 
justice would require a man to serve	.	.	.	undeserved years in 
prison when it knows that the sentence is improper. The 
fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our judicial system 
demand that we correct [these] sentence[s].242 
We should abandon the illusion that there are varying degrees of 
injustice when it comes to wrongfully imposed sentences. The Fourth 
Circuit, with its pre-existing conditions on the noncapital sentence 
exception, is a good place to start. The court has an opportunity to 
continue its progressive trend of recognizing the basic commonality 
between conviction innocence and sentence innocence claims. Doing 
so would not only set a tone that could reverberate nationwide, but 
would also achieve a just result for prisoners currently serving 
wrongfully imposed sentences. 
 
 241. See supra Part IV. 
 242. United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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